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The Impact of an Epidemic:
Experimental Evidence on Preference Stability from Wuhan
By Jason Shachat, Matthew J. Walker and Lijia Wei∗
Are preferences stable or are they poten-
tially influenced by formative events and
experiences? Questions of this type have
troubled economists for decades (Stigler
and Becker, 1977). Preference stability
underlies fundamental theories of decision-
making. For example, Samuelson’s (1937)
proposition of utility as a discounted sum of
rewards is based on the assumption that a
rational agent’s preferences are stationary.
We harness the exogenous shock of the
Covid-19 outbreak to provide controlled
evidence on the evolution of deep eco-
nomic parameters including trust, risk and
time preferences. Our study repeatedly
applies incentivized decision tasks via the
WeChat social media platform to a ran-
domly selected sample of 396 student sub-
jects in Wuhan, China - “ground zero” of
the epidemic. The experiments were con-
ducted from late January to early March
of 2020. We compare behavioural measure-
ments elicited during this period to those of
a pre-epidemic baseline sample of 206 sub-
jects recruited from the same population.
Our results suggest that the initial out-
break, coupled with the lockdown of Wuhan
City, undermined trust and tempered the
willingness of subjects to seek out unknown
situations. The outbreak also led to a fall in
risk aversion and there is marginal evidence
subjects exhibited more present bias in the
early stages of the crisis. Over the rest of
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the period, notwithstanding several inter-
esting transitory effects, we observe mea-
surements return to baseline levels with the
following exceptions: trust is elevated in
March relative to January; risk aversion re-
mains significantly below its baseline level;
and subjects become more averse to lying.
The results suggest that perturbations in
behaviour and preferences from a public
health crisis are sharp and can persist for
at least several months.
I. Stability of Economic Preferences
Providing robust empirical evidence on
the stability of economic preferences re-
quires eliciting controlled behavioural mea-
surements before and after an exogenous
shock. By its nature, such a shock must be
unanticipated and thus researchers have re-
lied heavily on natural experiments. When
such natural experiments arise, one way
scholars have addressed this question is by
evaluating the impact of personal economic
experiences on preferences. A seminal pa-
per in this literature is Malmendier and
Nagel (2011), who use data from between
birth cohorts to show that stock market
returns experienced are good predictors of
risk tolerance.
A separate literature has emerged around
the effect of natural disasters - such as
floods, earthquakes or hurricanes - on pref-
erences.1 Since natural disasters are by def-
inition unanticipated, most prior studies of
this type rely on measurements taken af-
ter the event, between groups with differ-
ential exposure.2 By contrast, behavioural
measurements from our control group were
elicited six months before the first reports
of Covid-19 emerged, which offers a natural
baseline for comparison.
1For a survey, see Chuang and Schechter (2015).
2A notable exception is Beine et al. (2020).
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II. Experimental Context and Design
The experiments in this study were
implemented using Ancademy, an online
platform for social science experiments
based on the open interface of WeChat
(https://www.ancademy.org/). This plat-
form facilitates experiments in which par-
ticipation and payments disbursed through
(but not limited) to one’s smartphone. In
May 2019, we deployed a set of behavioural
economics games and preference elicitation
tasks to a random sample of 206 student
subjects at Wuhan University.3 The out-
break of Covid-19 at the turn of 2020 en-
abled us to conduct a fortuitous natural ex-
periment. On January 23rd, the Chinese
authorities imposed a strict lockdown of
Wuhan city, followed shortly by lockdowns
of other cities throughout Hubei province.
By this time, many students at Wuhan Uni-
versity had returned home to celebrate the
Lunar New Year, the beginning of which
coincided with mass quarantine.4
Over the following six weeks, we moni-
tored subjects’ preferences and behaviour
in their place of quarantine. We conducted
five separate waves of sampling between
late January and early March (Table 1).
Data for Wave 1 were collected in the im-
mediate aftermath of the lockdown. Waves
2 and 3 were implemented either side of
the well-publicised death on February 7th
of Dr. Li Wenliang, an Ophthalmologist
and alumnus of Wuhan University who was
widely considered a hero for early warnings
of the Covid-19 outbreak (Green, 2020).
Waves 4 and 5 followed at two week inter-
vals thereafter. In each wave, we recruited a
random sample of (approximately) 80 sub-
jects from our subject population. To en-
sure comparability with the baseline, all
subjects completed the experiment using a
mobile device.
The decision-making tasks were designed
to capture deep economic parameters of
trust and trustworthiness, time, risk and
3This was part of a separate project examining how
the experimental interface affects decision-making.
4Media outlets at the time were dubbing this the
largest quarantine in human history, see for example,
https://apnews.com/7f7336d2ed099936bd59bf8cb7f43756.
ambiguity preferences, and truth-telling.
To measure trust and trustworthiness, we
use first-mover amounts sent and second-
mover amounts returned (as a proportion)
in a standard Trust game.5 Subjects are
randomly matched into pairs and to roles
within a pair. First movers then decide how
much of an 8 RMB endowment to send to
their match; the amount sent is tripled; and
the second mover decides how much of the
tripled amount to return. Any money not
returned is kept by the second mover.
To elicit time preference, subjects make a
series of nine pairwise choices between 100
RMB today or 100(1 + i) RMB one month
later, where the interest rate i increases uni-
formly from 0 to 0.24. The switching point
carries information about a subject’s dis-
count rate r, which we use to calculate her
annualized rate of patience as G = ( 1
1+r
)12.6
To elicit preference towards risk and am-
biguity, we present subjects with a list of
nine pairwise choices between a lottery and
a sure amount of money. The lottery prizes
are fixed across pairs: a chance to win 3
or 9 RMB. For the risk (ambiguity) task,
the probability of winning each amount is
50 percent (unknown). The sure amount in-
creases uniformly from 3 to 9 RMB. We use
the switching point in each task to calculate
risk and ambiguity aversion as an ordinal
variable increasing in a subject’s aversion.
To measure truth-telling, subjects are
asked to privately choose an integer at ran-
dom from 0-9, add this to the last num-
ber of their student ID and record the ones
digit. The system then randomly gener-
ates a number in the same interval and sub-
jects must report whether the two numbers
match. If they match (unobserved by the
experimenter), subjects’ earn 5 RMB, else
zero. The extent of lying is inferred from
the difference between the reported match-
5The Trust game was only implemented in one half
of sessions; in the other sessions, it was replaced with
the Ultimatum game (not reported here). This was to
prevent behavioural spillover effects between tasks.
6Raw switching points are in the appendix, along
with a second measure of time preference elicited be-
tween two future dates. For all elicitations, those sub-
jects who never switch are assigned a switching point of
10 and we exclude those who switch more than once.
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Table 1—Experimental waves and descriptive statistics of the main outcome variables.
Experimental wave: Baseline Wave 1 Wave 2 Wave 3 Wave 4 Wave 5
Dates of sampling: May 2019 Jan 24/26 Feb 4/6 Feb 7/8 Feb 21/22 Mar 6/7
Number of subjects: 206 80 78 80 78 80
Trust 3.39 1.75** 4.95** 3.6 3.66 4.42
[0, 8] (2.59) (1.80) (2.48) (2.44) (2.73) (2.59)
Trustworthiness 0.27 0.22 0.33 0.23 0.38 0.34
[0, 1] (0.21) (0.23) (0.20) (0.20) (0.23) (0.21)
Patience 0.43 0.39 0.37* 0.46 0.4 0.38
[0, 1] (0.27) (0.25) (0.28) (0.28) (0.26) (0.28)
Risk aversion 6.55 6.33* 6.08*** 6.74 6.29 6.05***
{1,2,...,10} (1.13) (0.86) (1.47) (1.18) (1.42) (1.58)
Ambiguity aversion 6.51 6.85 7.07*** 6.82*** 6.59 6.53
{1,2,...,10} (1.33) (1.40) (1.46) (1.75) (1.55) (1.55)
Truth-tellinga 0.66 0.65 0.62 0.66 0.6 0.51**
{0,1} (0.47) (0.48) (0.49) (0.48) (0.49) (0.50)
Note: Values are mean (standard deviation). ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, *p < 0.1, two-tailed Wilcoxon rank-sum tests
of equal means vs. Baseline, except for Truth-telling, which is based on Fisher’s exact test. a Expected rate of 0.10.
ing rate and the expected rate of 10%.
Subjects completed all tasks sequentially
with no feedback until all tasks were com-
pleted. Subjects were paid according to the
outcome of each task, earning an average of
65.68 RMB. Payments were made via the
WeChat pay facility. If the payoff-relevant
date for a task is in the future, payment is
received on the future date. Sessions lasted
about 45 minutes. No subject participated
in more than one session.
III. Results
A. Trust and Trustworthiness
As shown in Table 1, first-mover amounts
sent in the Trust game are significantly
lower in Wave 1 relative to the Baseline (p
= 0.02). This is driven by a mass of sub-
jects keeping their full endowment. Trust
recovers sharply in Wave 2 (p < 0.01) and
then remains significantly above the Wave
1 level.7 There is some evidence of a short-
term fall in amounts sent between Waves
2 and 3 (p = 0.098). There are few sys-
tematic differences in second-mover returns
after adjusting for the amount received.
7Detailed results of all statistical analyses in this sec-
tion are contained in the appendix.
To gain individual-level insight, we con-
duct a Tobit regression of amounts sent on
a categorical variable for the experimen-
tal waves, a dummy for being in Wuhan
during 2020, and demographic control vari-
ables. There is evidence of a gender ef-
fect: the coefficient estimate on the fe-
male dummy is positive and highly signif-
icant (p < 0.01). The estimate on the
Wuhan dummy, however, is negative and
more than offsets the gender effect (p <
0.01). The fitted values from this analysis
are presented in Figure 1, for all subjects
(black squares), subjects based in Wuhan
(orange circles) and subjects based outside
of Wuhan (blue triangles). We observe
lower trust among Wuhan-based subjects,
although this is based on small sample size.
B. Time, Risk, Ambiguity and Truth-telling
The average annualized rate of patience
in our Baseline sample is 0.43. This rate
decreases to 0.37 in Wave 2 and the dif-
ference is marginally significant (p = 0.09).
Again, there is a fluctuation between Waves
2 and 3, in which subjects temporarily place
greater value on the future (p = 0.09). Our
measure of time preference ends the 2020
sampling period where it began.
Risk aversion is significantly lower in
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Figure 1. Fitted values of the main outcome variables by experimental wave.
Note: Fitted values are for all subjects (black squares), subjects based in Wuhan (orange circles) and subjects based
outside of Wuhan (blue triangles), from censored regressions of the outcome on indicators for the experimental wave
relative to the Baseline, and controls. Whiskers indicate 95% confidence intervals, based on robust standard errors.
The dashed line in the Truth-telling panel indicates the expected rate of truth-telling given our design.
Waves 1 and 2 than in the Baseline (respec-
tively, p = 0.06 and p < 0.01). The down-
ward trend is interrupted in Wave 3 with
a pronounced spike upwards (p < 0.01).
By Wave 5, risk aversion is back below the
Baseline level (p < 0.01). Ambiguity aver-
sion is significantly elevated in Waves 1, 2
and 3 (respectively, p = 0.02, p < 0.01 and
p < 0.01). This bias does not persist. By
Wave 5, ambiguity aversion is significantly
below the Wave 2 level (p = 0.02). While
the distribution of switching points in the
Baseline appears to exhibit two modes, the
aftermath of the Covid-19 outbreak shifts
the lower mode to the right, creating a uni-
modal distribution.
Across all waves, reported matching rates
are significantly above the expected rate
given perfect truth-telling. There is no sys-
tematic difference in lying propensity be-
tween the Baseline and Wave 1 samples (p
= 0.89). There is evidence that subjects be-
come more averse to lying as the crisis un-
folds. In Wave 5, 51% of subjects report a
match, significantly below the Baseline fre-
quency of 66% (p = 0.03).
Similar behavioural trends can be found
in Figure 1 and are robust to controlling for
observed covariates. Wuhan-based subjects
are more impatient and more averse to risk
and ambiguity, although these differences
are not significant at the 10% level.
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IV. Discussion and Conclusion
The results from the decision-making
tasks suggest that preferences are liable
to be influenced by formative events and
experiences. The Covid-19 outbreak in
China initially undermines subjects’ trust,
but this is followed by a sustained period
of greater trust in others. There is prece-
dent for this: Cassar, Healy and von Kessler
(2017) observe a similar phenomenon after
the 2004 tsunami in Thailand.
We observe differential responses in the
domains of risk and ambiguity. Whereas
subjects are more risk tolerant after the
crisis, they are less willing to seek out un-
known situations. While such a divergence
has previously been observed in response to
a change in deterrence policies (Cavatorta
and Groom, 2020), we are not aware of such
a pattern being identified in response to a
natural catastrophe. In the Covid-19 con-
text, it is plausible that individuals are cau-
tious in the face of uncertainty (such as tak-
ing preventative measures to avoid catching
the virus), but after contracting the virus
were willing to take significant risks to avoid
the worst outcome (death).
Our finding of decreased risk aversion
contrasts with related evidence on risk tak-
ing in financial markets (Li et al., 2020).
The advantage of a natural experiment is
to enable a separation between changes in
risk-return ratios and underlying risk pref-
erence.
Finally, we observe a sharp discontinuity
in elicited measures of trust, patience and
risk aversion before and after the death of
Dr. Li Wenliang, an event that appeared to
resonate in the collective unconsciousness of
ordinary Chinese citizens.
Differential selection into the Baseline
and post-Covid samples is clearly a poten-
tial confound in our design, and so we re-
main cautious in any causal interpretation.
Nevertheless, the marked short-term fluctu-
ations between our 2020 waves suggest that
the time between measurements is an im-
portant factor to consider when making in-
ferences as to the impact of natural events
on preferences.
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